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Findings like the above stimulated a backlash against the symbolic-
interactionism perspective. According to this perspective, self-perceptions should
be readily shaped by—indeed should passively mirror—public perceptions. How-
ever, it turns out that self-perceptions are only partly influenced by social feedback
and are barely (if at all) congruent with other's perceptions of the self (Shrauger
& Schoeneman, 1979). Subsequent research has confirmed and clarified these
findings. Individuals overestimate the consistency of others' appraisals of them,
and, although they are somewhat clued in to how groups perceive them, they are
relatively clueless about how specific others perceive them (Felson, 1993; Kenny
& DePaulo, 1993). In general, people rely on their own self-views, rather than
on social feedback, in coming to understand how others perceive them (Kenny &
DePaulo, 1993; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1995). Incidentally, this ignorance is
specific to the self: individuals do know how much other people like each other
(Kenny, Bond, Mohr, & Horn, 1996).
Why are people in the dark when it comes to knowing how others view them?
Owing to normative rules of conduct, people are reluctant to openly reveal their
true impressions of others, especially when those impressions are negative; and,
for their part, people are also understandably reluctant to discover others'
(possibly negative) impressions of them. Hence, the spontaneous or requested
provision of direct feedback is rare. In its absence, people typically fail to recognize
their intellectual and social incompetence, lacking the requisite metacognitive
expertise (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003; Wilson & Dunn, 2004).
Moreover, when feedback is given, it is often in institutionalized form (e.g.,
exam results) and can be either too general or too specific to improve the accuracy
of self-knowledge. The failure to self-assess accurately is further impeded by self-
defensive responses to critical feedback, including external attributions for failure,
derogation of the evaluator, and motivated forgetting of uncongenial information
(Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Sedikides, Green, & Pinter, 2004; Sedikides &
Strube, 1997). The fact that individuals actively seek out positive feedback, and
interpret ambiguous feedback as positive, further impedes accurate self-
assessment (Felson, 1993; Kenny & DePaulo, 1993; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003).
Thus, two cognitive blindspots—(a) impaired self-knowledge, and (b) impaired
knowledge of others' impressions of self—partially explain why cultivating mod-
esty is difficult. However, there is also a motivational factor at play: the direct
self-esteem costs of modesty. In an early demonstration of this effect (Jones,
Rhodewalt, Berglas, & Skelton, 1981), experimental participants either (a) mim-
icked the modest behavior of an interviewee while they were being interviewed,
(b) role-played the modest self-presentational tactics of a job candidate, or (c)
interviewed under direct experimental instructions to be modest. Compared to
controls, participants in all conditions experienced a marked drop in self-esteem.
Evidently, being modest does not feel good (for conceptual replications, see
Kowalski & Leary, 1990; Rhodewalt & Agustsdottir, 1986).
Nonetheless, we still argue below that it is important to be modest, because
being modest confers countervailing benefits, both social and intrapsychic.THE MODEST SELF 173
BENEFITS OF MODESTY VERSOS SELF-ENHANCEMENT:
AN ATTEMPT AT RECONCILIATION
The empirical record is generally consistent with modesty fostering (a) positive
interpersonal evaluations, (b) positive intragroup evaluations, and (c) a construct-
ive social orientation. However, the argument that modesty affords self-regulatory
benefits—and ultimately psychological adjustment—is controversial. Indeed,
another body of literature suggests that high rather than intermediate self-
enhancement is conducive to psychological adjustment (cf. Joiner, Kistner,
Stellrecht, & Merrill, 2006).
Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, and McDowell (2003) operationalized self-
enhancement in terms of superiority ratings. In particular, they used the How
I See Myself measure (Taylor & Golwitzer, 1995), the Self-Deceptive Enhance-
ment measure (Paulhus, 1998), and a modified version of the Personal
Desirability of Traits measure (Krueger, 1998). Regardless of operationalization,
self-enhancement linearly predicted psychological adjustment. Specifically, self-
enhancement was positively related to mental health (e.g., personal growth,
positive relations, purpose in life, self-acceptance), positively related to psycho-
logical resources (e.g., optimism, self-esteem, mastery, extraversion, positive
reframing, planning, family support, active coping), and negatively related to
mental distress (e.g., depression, anxiety, hostility). Relatedly, Sedikides, Rudich,
Gregg, Kumashiro, and Rusbult (2004) showed that high levels of self-enhancement
(operationalized as narcissism) positively predicted adjustment (e.g., subjective
well-being) and negatively predicted maladjustment (e.g., depression, anxiety,
neuroticism), with the link being entirely mediated by self-esteem. Gregg, Hepper,
and Sedikides (2007) also found that the self-reported desire for self-enhancing
feedback ("In general, I like to hear that I am great"), but not accuracy feedback
("In general, I like to hear the truth about myself), predicted subjective
well-being.
Furthermore, in an applied study, Bonanno, Field, Kovacevic, and Kaltman
(2002) reported that self-enhancement (operationalized as Self-Deceptive
Enhancement) was positively related to ratings of psychological adjustment among
Bosnian civilians exposed to urban combat at wartime. Here, adjustment ratings
were made by mental health experts on the basis of structured interviews. In
addition, in a sample of individuals whose spouses had died, Bonanno et al. (2002)
found that self-enhancement predicted positive adjustment 2 years afterwards.
Moreover, in a study of high-exposure survivors of the September 11 terrorist
attacks (i.e., exposure to others' death and injury), Bonanno et al. (2005) reported
that self-enhancement (again operationalized as Self-Deceptive Enhancement)
was associated not only with positive affect (among persons who experienced low
physical danger) but also with resilience (i.e., a stable and low-symptom pattern
following traumatic events) and reduced social constraints (i.e., perceived freedom
to disclose one's concerns and worries). Note that, in this connection, the psycho-
logical adjustment benefits of self-enhancement are universal. Self-serving attribu-
tions, overoptimism, and perceptions of self-efficacy are positively related with174 THE SELF
well-being or self-esteem and negatively related with depression not only in indi-
vidualistic cultures (e.g., the US; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003; Taylor et al., 2003) but
also in such collectivistic cultures as China (Anderson, 1999), Hong Kong (Stewart
et al., 2003), Japan (Kobayashi & Brown, 2003), Korea (Chang, Sanna, & Yang,
2003), and Singapore (Kurman & Sriram, 1997).
As for the proposition that self-enhancement entails social costs, the evi-
dence here is not particularly supportive. Taylor et al. (2003) found that self-
enhancement was positively associated with peer ratings of participants' mental
health, judged on the basis of videotaped interviews of the participants. In add-
ition, participants who rated themselves as better than their peers (i.e., self-
enhancers) were better adjusted than those who rated themselves as the same as
their peers (i.e., modest). Tellingly, the more they self-enhanced, the more favor-
ably their friends viewed them. Moreover, Bonanno et al. (2005) reported that, in
general, self-enhancers were liked by relatives and friends. Finally, Sedikides et al.
(2005) found that narcissism was negatively related to loneliness and positively
related to well-being in a relationship. However, Bonanno et al. (2002) did report
that untrained observers rated self-enhancers less favorably than they rated their
modest counterparts when the topic of the videotaped interview concerned a
sensitive and aversive event (e.g., the recent death of a spouse).
How can these contradictory findings be reconciled? To begin with, there is
little disagreement that individuals who present themselves to others in an arro-
gant or grandiose fashion invite dislike and derision. How do these boasters cope
with their disapproving social milieu? It is possible they are unaware of others'
disapproval (Kenny & DePaulo, 1993), and/or immune to it (Robins & Beer,
2001). Boasters may be resilient enough to chart their own course and follow
it relentlessly, despite the presence of social obstacles (Campbell & Foster,
chapter 6, this volume).
Nevertheless, private and public self-enhancement is correlated (Wallace &
Baumeister, 2002), a grandiose self-presentational style may not always reflect
an overinflated ego, nor may a modest self-presentational style always mask one
(Taylor et al., 2003). Regardless of self-presentational style, then, do self-enhancers
suffer long-term relational liabilities? Bonanno et al. (2005) obtained observer
ratings of participants before and after the September 11 attacks. These longi-
tudinal data provided evidence for deteriorating social relationships: relatives and
friends rated self-enhancers as decreasing in social adjustment a year and half after
the attacks. They also rated high-exposure self-enhancers as becoming increas-
ingly dishonest. Robins and Beer (2001, Study 2) found a decline in self-esteem
and well-being among self-enhancers. This pattern, however, may be restricted
to narcissists. Their boastful, uncooperative, and disruptive behavior breeds
unpopularity, which may lead to ostracism from the social groups they join. Ostra-
cism, in turn, is associated with psychological maladjustment (Abrams, Marques,
& Hogg, 2005; Twenge, chapter 14, this volume; Williams, Forgas, & von Hippel,
2005). Such findings invite further longitudinal studies that track perceptions of
self-enhancers in both socially innocuous and socially delicate situations, and in
both low-stress and high-stress situations.
Are self-enhancers capable of forming enduring relationships? ResearchTHE MODEST SELF 175
indicates that they can and do form friendships and close relationships. However,
it is possible that, via assortative social processes, chronic self-enhancers manage
to attract friends or romantic partners who both admire and care for them
(Campbell, 1999; Campbell & Foster, chapter 6, this volume). Indeed, in Taylor
et al.'s (2003) study, self-enhancers were rated favorably by relatively long-lasting
friends (i.e., of 4 years). Chronic self-enhancers are liable to use their relationships
with other to maintain their sense of inflated self-importance (Sedikides, Campbell
et al., 2002), to perceive their social environment as supportive and feel comfort-
able when self-disclosing (Bonanno et al., 2005), and enjoy the accompanying
adjustment benefits of such an orientation, without necessarily putting the
well-being of their relations at risk (Sedikides, Rudich et al., 2004).
Is the long-term psychological adjustment provided by self-enhancement
offset by social costs? The evidence suggests not. In Bonanno et al.'s (2002) study,
the relatively negative impressions that interviewees formed of participants were
unrelated to participants' levels of adjustment. Future research, however, may
explore some interesting possibilities. First, chronic self-enhancers, to the extent
that they are relatively ungrateful and unforgiving toward others, may be deprived
of important health gains (e.g., optimism, positive emotionality, life satisfaction,
vitality) and thereby endanger their psychological health (e.g., depression, anxiety,
neuroticism). Second, chronic self-enhancers, to the extent that they exploit their
social relationships for private psychological ends, will not have full access to
the many benefits of enduring relationship, such as protection against stress, anx-
iety, depression, trauma, and daily hassles (Kumashiro & Sedikides, 2005; Vohs
& Finkel, 2006).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We began this chapter by defining modesty. We then argued that, despite the
difficulties involved in cultivating and sustaining modesty, it entails intrapersonal,
interpersonal, and intragroup benefits. We concluded with an attempt to reconcile
the discrepancies between two empirical literatures, one suggesting that modesty
entails social and mental health benefits, the other suggesting that self-
enhancement does (without prohibitive social costs).
Modesty may bestow minimal mental health gains in the short run, but intra-
personal and interpersonal benefits in the long run. Alternatively, modesty and
self-enhancement may be associated with different types of mental health gains.
For example, self-enhancement may be linked most strongly with resilience, and
modesty with life satisfaction. Likewise, modesty and self-enhancement may be
associated with different types of social benefits. For example, self-enhancement
may promote advancement to glamorous and high-status social positions (e.g.,
actor, politician), whereas modesty may promote advancement to useful and
moderate-status positions (e.g., civil servant, nurse). Future research would do
well to focus on untangling this complex interplay of factors. Both modesty and
self-enhancement may be critical to attaining different aspects of optimal human
functioning (Passmore, 2000; Sheldon, 2004; Sedikides & Luke, in press).